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THE IDEALIST VIEW OF DIVINE ACTION IN NATURE
by Edward Epsen
Abstract. Theologies of divine action in nature have sought to
maximize traction with the sciences to secure their credibility. While
varying in significant ways, all extant proposals share a commitment
to physical realism, the claim that (at least some) physical entities
and facts are both mind-independent and ontologically basic within
creation. However, I will argue that this metaphysical commitment
undermines the body of scientific knowledge to which theologians
wish to be responsive. Is there an alternative? Building on the work
of Howard Robinson, I will show that there is a coherent account of
mind’s place in nature that denies physical realism. Such an account
would enable a theological description of God’s sustaining and gov-
erning action in nature through the ontological mediation of minds
and laws causally constraining their sensations. Furthermore, this
proposal yields a positive research program that makes essential use
of the contributions of the natural sciences to understand the nature
of embodiment.
Keywords: conceptualism; divine action; idealism; laws of nature;
phenomenalism; qualia; realism; reduction; supervenience
Introduction
One way in which the dialogue between theology and science has taken
shape is through theologians’ attempt to craft proposals regarding divine
action in nature. These proposals were institutionalized through the Di-
vine Action Project, a collaboration from 1988 to 2004 between the Vati-
can Observatory and a Scientific Organizing Committee led by Robert J.
Russell. The project sought in effect to update expositions of the doctrine
of providence in a manner directly responsive to the current body of sci-
entific knowledge concerning the workings of nature.1 The first wave of
divine action proposals typically looked for divine causal influence at sites
of unpredictability afforded within the scope of natural laws. These so-
called causal joint joint proposals included positing divine influence on the
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collapse of the quantum wave function (Russell 2006), genetic mutation
(Ward 1996), and the chaos of dynamical systems (Polkinghorne 1994).
These standard proposals have been critiqued on theological grounds
for invoking a “God of the gaps” and for being effectively deistic in their
conception of the God-world relation and the demand that divine action
be noninterventionist.2 A new wave of theistic counter-proposals have
come forward to correct this, including, for example, James K.A. Smith’s
(2010) “pneumatological naturalism,” Christopher Knight’s (2004) pa-
nentheism, and Michael Dodds’s (2012) Thomistic account of divine
action.
A striking feature of all extant proposals is the assumption that mutually
constructive dialogue with the sciences requires that one accept a realist
interpretation of the success of science. This article seeks to break new
ground by working on two fronts: first, by critiquing the position that
physical realism makes the most sense of current scientific practice; and
second, by articulating a view of divine action that does not presuppose
physical realism but does afford a positive research program that includes
the contributions of the natural sciences.
The inclination to say that physical realism (to be defined below) makes
the most sense of scientific practice has a variety of sources. One is the
commonsense opinion that in everyday and scientific interaction with the
world what our hypothesizing and testing brushes up against is an objec-
tive world-structure not of our own making; this inclines us to the philo-
sophical inference that realism is the best explanation of this objectivity.
Another source is the widely held opinion that, just as the natural sciences
have achieved explanatory success without needing to invoke the mind and
its powers, so too will the sciences of the brain eventually succeed in ex-
plaining mental phenomena in purely physicalist terms. To make way for
an idealist view of divine action in nature, both of these inferences must
be critiqued. Showing why they are flawed teaches us something positive
about the ontological status of what is studied in the sciences. The plurality
and partiality of the sciences strongly suggest that the human perspective,
with its distinct sensory and conceptual capacities, makes a necessary con-
tribution to the identities of even their most basic content. To deny this,
as realism requires, undermines the empirical accessibility of nature and so
our claim to scientific knowledge. But accepting the fact that the empiri-
cal content of the sciences conceptually depends on the human perspective
allows a theologian to propose an idealist view of nature and so of God’s
action within it.
This article is therefore organized into the following sections. In the sec-
tion “Introduction” I diagnose the motivation for realism from the desire
to maintain the world’s objectivity. In the section “Order, Objectivity, and
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Physical Realism,” I show why the metaphysics of realism need not, and
should not, be regarded as the best way to account for the world’s objec-
tivity. I also present arguments for an idealist alternative. In the section
“How Should a Theologian Identify the World God Produces?,” I present
the outlines of a constructive idealist account of divine action in nature. In
the section “Embodiment and the Subjects of the Sciences,” I show how
this constructive account re-imagines the relation between theology and
science. And in the final section I conclude.
Order, Objectivity, and Physical Realism
In treating the subject of divine action in nature, Christian theologians
want to be able to avoid being pantheists or deists and maintain that God
wholly transcends what he creates while also being immanently present
within it to sustain its existence through time and direct it toward cer-
tain ends. But they also want to be able to recognize the objectivity of
the observable world as the source of our empirical knowledge and this
is normally, I think, a motivation to espouse physical realism. Securing
objectivity has been a prominent theme in modern science and theology
scholarship.3 Realism suggests itself as one way to achieve this. Once ob-
jectivity is safeguarded via realism about space and matter, some cosmic
place has to be found for the human mind with its distinct consciousness
and rational agency. For reasons I will not attempt to diagnose here, the-
ologians, even more than philosophers, have an aversion to Cartesian dual-
ism, which would take the mind to be an ontologically primitive substance
within creation. This means that human rational agency must be grafted
onto matter as its ontological base, typically the matter of the brain. This
is the strategy of the emergentist metaphysics of panentheism, where mind
is conceived of as a novelty produced from the organizational complexity
of an underlying material base.4
This is the sort of move that can seem natural or tempting when ac-
cepting physical realism is regarded as a logical consequence of accepting
the results of modern science. There is a tendency among theologians,
however, to confuse physical realism with an acceptance of modern sci-
ence and objectivity.5 A possible source of this confusion can be found in
the thought of Thomas Torrance (1969), with echoes in the tradition of
scientific theology that stems from him.6 He writes:
…this is the great story of modern thought, whether it be in theology, sci-
ence, or philosophy: the struggle for fidelity, for appropriate methods and
apposite modes of speech, and therefore for the proper adaptation of the
human subject to the object of his knowledge, whether it be God or the
world of nature and man; but it is also the story of the struggles of man
with himself, for somehow the more he comes to know, the more masterful
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he tries to be and the more he imposes himself upon reality, the more he
gets in the way of his own progress.7
For Torrance this is the problem of “genuine objectivity.” When Torrance
rejects idealism he takes it to be incompatible with a recognition of nature’s
objectivity and to imply some kind of license for an exploitative attitude.
The failure to distinguish absolute subjectivity from idealism and objec-
tivity from realism depends on a failure to distinguish different kinds of
subject-dependence or mind-dependence. Something can be objective in
the sense of public, or that which is intersubjectively available for cognitive
scrutiny and agreement and not dependent on human volition, without
thereby being nonperspectival or conceptually independent of other as-
pects of human mentality (such as sensation and conceptual articulation).
If objectivity means that the observable world is persistent and pub-
lically available for identification and reidentification over time and by
different observers, then objectivity is perfectly compatible with the denial
of realism. Objectivity in this sense only requires that our sensations are
externally caused with repeatable content possessing an intersubjective co-
herence that is not of our own making. This bare recognition is neutral
with respect to the ontological status of what causally constrains our sen-
sations. Physical realism goes beyond a mere acceptance of the objectivity
of the observable world to make a metaphysical claim, one intended to ac-
count for that objectivity; the observable world is objective because our ob-
servations are caused by an ontologically primitive and mind-independent
physical world.8
A similar point applies to the epistemic results of modern science. We
can accept scientific theories as delivering truths about what is observable
without accepting the realist’s metaphysical explanation that these theo-
ries are true because of the existence of unobservable entities and prop-
erties corresponding to certain theoretical terms. As a metaphysical ex-
planation of the success of science, realism differs from what a scientific
explanation would look like. A scientific explanation would have to be
commensurable with the same scientific apparatus whose success it was
trying to account for. It would have to involve no more than the full
battery of models, measurement, experiments, hypotheses, theories, and
their wider institutional infrastructure. In other words, it would just look
like more science. And this is what science has done in the course of
its history. Where there is a judgment of past success, this success is in-
ternally conserved, seeking conceptual integration with current scientific
practice as much as possible. The very constraints that make empirical
science possible and allow it to achieve its success, the way it delimits its
terms, targets, and possible outcomes, also keep it discretely separated from
metaphysics.9
928 Zygon
How Should a Theologian Identify the World God
Produces?
My point above is not that we should avoid nonscientific explanations
of the success of science. Rather we should recognize that, pace McGrath
and others, realism is neither required nor warranted by science. There
are alternative explanations of its success and choosing among them will
involve intellectual and pragmatic considerations that go beyond science.
I believe a science-engaged theology of divine action cannot avoid the task
of selecting a metaphysical foundations for science that both explains its
success and coheres with Church doctrine.
To do this, a theologian must first decide how to identify the prod-
uct of creation that the Bible calls earth, the lesser of the two unequal
halves of “the heavens and the earth”(Gen 1:1). Suppose we decide that
“earth” corresponds not just to soil or our planet but to the total phys-
ical world. Then, I suggest, we still have a choice to make between the
observable physical world and the unobservable. We can adopt a useful
piece of terminology and think of the observable physical world as the
“manifest image.”10 This is the world of nature as it manifests itself within
actual and potential human sensory experience, the world of stars and
sky, rivers, trees, and soil, all things recounted in the biblical narrative of
earth’s creation, as well as the events of human history. The manifest im-
age is contrasted with the “scientific image,” which is what results from the
reification of some of the theoretical terms for unobservables, used in sci-
entific theories about nature. This is the world of atoms, waves, particles,
forces, fields, light, energy, black holes, and the big bang.11 As theologians
we certainly want to say that the physical world produced in creation in-
cludes the manifest image and is objective. But as I have suggested, we
need to be very cautious in how we account for the manifest image’s ob-
jectivity. If we give the physical realist’s account, we are going beyond the
practice of science to make a metaphysical claim: we are saying either that
the manifest image is wholly mind-independent and ontologically basic
in itself as, for instance, on some contemporary hylomorphic and strong
emergentist accounts12; or that the manifest image is the epiphenomenal
“by product” of some fundamental level within the scientific image that is
mind-independent and ontologically basic.13
To understand why neither of these options is satisfactory it will help
to introduce the following distinctions. In general terms, there are three
different kinds of existence claim we can make about the ontological status
of certain classes of items:
Three Kinds of Existence Claim
nihilism—deny Fs exist; reductivism—Fs exist derivatively; realism—Fs exist
primitively
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A reductivist about the existence of Fs will say that Fs exist but only be-
cause their existence is mediated by the existence of something else. This
something else may itself exist derivatively or it may be primitive. When
something exists derivatively, the mediation of its existence may be more
or less transparent to us. Again quite generally, there are four significant
ways in which the mediation of something’s existence can be discovered,
resulting in four different reduction strategies in which the discovered me-
diation is progressively less transparent.
Four Kinds of Reduction
analytic reduction redefine Fs;
nomic reduction find laws for Fs;14
logical supervenience find conditions that are (prospectively) conceptually
sufficient for instances of F;
natural supervenience find conditions that are (retrospectively) causally suf-
ficient for instances of F.
In each case, one posits a reduction relation between the things to be
reduced and some “lower level” ontological stratum. Notice that super-
venience relations are only posited between instances rather than kinds.
So a particular event E supervenes on a particular event B just in case,
necessarily, there can be a change in E only if there is a change in B
(where the modality in question is either logical or natural necessity). For
this reason, supervenience is not always regarded as a form of reduction
because the supervening stratum is allowed to have its own autonomous
kinds, which may thus possess an ineliminable explanatory significance.15
For example, most twentieth-century philosophy of mind concentrated
on existence claims about the realm of the mental and tried to show
that the mental was reducible to the physical in one of the four ways
above.16 In the absence of a plausible strategy for reducing certain kinds
of mental states to certain kinds of physical states, so-called nonreductive
physicalist views have claimed instead that particular mental events either
logically or naturally supervene on underlying physical events and so
are ontologically mediated by them, with mental predicates nonetheless
enjoying an explanatory autonomy. Many recent divine action proposals
have sought to make use of these explanatorily autonomous or emergent
properties either as causal joints (where God can exert “downward” causal
influence) or as an updated conception of Aristotelian forms.17
However, we can turn the tables and ask existence questions about the
physical realm. When we do, we are invited to consider a different way of
conceiving of the relation between the manifest and scientific images. All
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extant divine action proposals hold that some physical Fs form an onto-
logically primitive core within the physical world, yielding:
Physical Realism
The physical world is (at least partially) mind-independent and ontologi-
cally primitive.18
The standard version is to identify the ontologically primitive core of the
physical world with some part of the scientific image, like space, time, mat-
ter, and “fundamental forces,” with everything else in the physical world
having its existence mediated by these primitives, or facts about them, in
one of the four ways above.
By contrast, the idealist thesis of phenomenalism denies both conjuncts
of the physical realist’s claim.19
Phenomenalism
The physical world is exhaustively ontologically mediated by mental facts,
including facts about the organization of human sensory experience and
human conceptual capacities.
Physical realism imagines that conscious minds are either nothing more
than brains or that they somehow emerge from, and so supervene on,
nonconscious matter when organized at a suitable level of complexity.
Phenomenalism takes the realist’s supervenience relation and turns it on
its head. According to the phenomenalist, it is the structure and content
of the physical world that supervenes on facts about minds, how they are
appeared to, and how they interpret those appearances.
To better understand the kind of reductivist existence claim about phys-
ical Fs that phenomenalism makes, consider Howard Robinson’s (2016)
distinction between the realist and the conceptualist interpretation (CI) of
the existence question.20
(CI) We have the concept “F.” Is the world so organized that it satisfies this
concept in the way this is necessary for the standard or paradigm uses of
that concept?
(RI) Forget about us and our concepts. If there were no conceptualizers
around (putting God or divine minds aside) would there be Fs?
It is consistent with the CI of the existence question about physical Fs for
the phenomenalist to entertain any one of the reduction strategies listed
above. Recognizing the availability of the CI helps to bring out the funda-
mental role played by facts about human receptive capacities, both percep-
tual and cognitive, and human aims and interests, not only in determining
the content of the special sciences but in fixing the identities of even the
basic physical entities. In other words, it is not just that pragmatic concerns
are a factor in the way scientific theories are shaped; but more incisively
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that human receptive capacities set an existential bound on the identities
and individuation of natural phenomena.21
This radical claim can be reached as a conclusion from different
arguments, and Robinson’s recent monograph explores two mutually
supportive but different routes. One involves the recognition that our
very notion of the physical as something qualitative—that is, more than
merely mathematical or formal—is conceptually dependent on the qual-
itative features of human experience. We usually assume that because the
empirical sciences proceed successfully enough in describing the causal
structure of the nonconscious world, that the same empirical methods
will eventually succeed in explaining the nature of conscious mentality.
Because it tends to be assumed that physical realism is the best way of
accounting for the success of science, we also tend to assume that some
category of the physical is the right stratum to hold fixed while looking
for a reduction strategy for consciousness.
However, this way of conceiving of the dialectical situation is a mistake.
We necessarily rely on mind-dependent sensible qualities drawn from the
manifest image of the world in order to conceive of it as concretely physi-
cal, as the kind of thing we could experience. In other words, the phenom-
enalist claims that:
The Argument from the Concreteness of the Physical
(i) what gives concrete, qualitative content to our conception of the
physical is sensible qualities; and
(ii) sensible qualities are mind-dependent; they are uniquely revealed in
conscious experience.
Therefore,
(iii) we have no conception of the physical as something qualitative except
as a possible object of experience.
So physical realism, which would insist on something physical being both
mind-independent and ontologically primitive, is not only false but in fact
conceptually incoherent. It is sensible qualities, which are but the objec-
tive content of what it is like for a subject to experience them, that con-
cretize the physical and make it into something qualitative and not just
formally abstract. From the conclusion (iii) it follows immediately that
mind-dependent sensible qualities are necessary for any qualitative con-
ception of the physical. Strictly speaking this conclusion is not logically
equivalent to the thesis of phenomenalism (which involves the notion of
ontological mediation); but the conclusion does entail the denial of both
conjuncts of physical realism and gives support to phenomenalism in a
conspicuously strong way.
Whereas the above argument focuses on the contribution of mind-
dependent sensible qualities to the empirical content of the sciences, there
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is an alternative route to phenomenalism that is more focused on the con-
tributions of our concepts, interests, and perspective. This second route is
not quite so concise and is broken into two stages sketched below.
A Two-Stage Argument for Phenomenalism (Or Conceptualism about Ev-
erything Physical)
Stage 1: An argument for dualism (minds are ontologically primitive):
(i′) The subjects of the special sciences require interpretation.
(ii′) Interpretation requires human minds as interpreter.
(iii′) Therefore, there are human minds.
The support for (i) comes from recognizing that the special sciences, un-
like physics and chemistry, are selective and involve Gestalt concepts that
are not the sort of thing that can be studied in physics and chemistry.22
These concepts are teleological and are selected by the grain of human
sense perception and human interest. Consider how the identities of the
following objects are fixed:
London Buildings? Geography? People? Government?…
House An artifact but also a strange kind of abstract-concrete con-
tainer;
Book An artifact but also an even stranger kind of abstract-concrete
chimera;
Mountain A natural object whose identity is determined by extrinsic rela-
tions;
River A natural object whose identity conditions are approximately
psychic;
Tree A natural object whose identity conditions are approximately
psychic.
This list of items contains names of both artifacts and natural objects.
The named items all have identities that are vague, teleological, and pos-
sess Gestalt qualities. The identities of these items change in ways that
are sensitive both to extrinsic relations and our perspective and interests.
Technical terms of art, where a precise definition is stipulated, are a limit-
ing case in that they are entirely determined by our rational intentions and
can be quite arbitrary. By contrast, the identities of artifacts and natural
objects are fixed in ways that are effortlessly understood, yet dependent on
factors that are rich, complex, and arbitrary but to a more limited degree.
None of the common names above can be given a nomic or analytic reduc-
tion into the terms of physics or any other discourse; their meanings are
conceptually autonomous in that sense. At the same time there is a clear
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sense that, when regarded as bare concreta, as spatiotemporally determinate
things, they supervene on the stratum of physics.23
Another thing one notices about these identities is that they are tri-
chotomously regarded either as crudely mechanical, abstractly functional,
or as possessing properties of psychic continuity borrowed from our no-
tion of human persons. So, for instance, a house can be regarded con-
cretely as a spatial arrangement of stones, more abstractly but still con-
cretely as a kind of container, and finally in a wholly abstract way as a
home (which is then psychically parasitic on the person whose home it
is). This is telling. It points to the fact that personal identity is the stan-
dard for individualization.24 Personal identity, unlike, the looser forms of
unity and persistence we attribute to items in the world, does not admit
of vagueness, indeterminacy, or dismissal in favor of some more refined
notion. Now when we consider things studied in the special sciences, we
seem to have the option of identifying them from teleological perspectives
that are self-consciously partial and so dismissible when our interests shift.
The content of earth sciences such as geology, hydrology, and meteorology
arises because we are selectively interested in the habitability of the earth’s
surface. From an impartial or observer-neutral perspective, these phenom-
ena are but arbitrary spatiotemporal sections of the total flow of physical
events within the universe. To segregate certain collections of atoms, to
mark off certain beginnings and ends of their collective movements, and
furthermore to regard certain classes of collective movements as relevantly
similar, as those of, say, hurricanes, earthquakes, or viral epidemics is to
adopt a special-interest interpretive perspective. The same is true of the
medical sciences and biology generally insofar as it makes us of functional
explanations. Even these brief considerations strongly suggest that the sub-
jects of the special sciences require interpretation, as stated in (i’). I shall
not take the time to defend (ii’), but it is difficult to conceive of how in-
terpretation is possible without there being rational agents who perform
interpretations, agents who are the conscious subjects whose perspectives
and acts of conceptualizing are what proliferate the sciences.25 Notice that
the interpreting mind cannot itself be the product of interpretation or the
subject of a merely empirical psychology. This would lead to a vicious
circle. Minds are invoked exactly to answer the question of what agency
generates the many interpretations unique to the human perspective.26
With the argument for dualism in place, Robinson’s final step to a full-
blown phenomenalism involves recognizing the inadequacy of a bare spa-
tiotemporal description for the purpose of individuation, which is what
would be required if there were physical simples.27 A little more formally
we have:
Stage 2: An argument against realism about physical simples:
(i) Physical simples are merely spatiotemporally individuated.
934 Zygon
(ii) Entities that are merely spatiotemporally individuated cannot sustain
counterfactuals of origin; so their identities are ineliminably vague.
(iii) Entities that exist in the realist sense cannot be vague in this way.
(iv) Therefore, there are no physical simples (and hence no physical enti-
ties in the realist sense).28
Robinson’s idea is that if we imagine physical simples, whatever they hap-
pen to be—say bare Newtonian atoms29—there can be nothing more to
how we individuate them empirically then their spatiotemporal trajecto-
ries. For suppose we ask a question like, “If instead of this atom coming
into existence where it did, an atom had come into existence 2 meters to
the left, would it be the same atom?” There is no way to answer the ques-
tion because all empirical criteria are exhausted by the description of the
atom’s spatiotemporal trajectory.30 But if atoms exist in the realist sense
this question should have a determinate answer. The realist has the option
to say that despite all appearances, the atom in fact has some mysterious in-
dividuality, some hidden haecaeitas, that would give a determinate answer
for each version of the question.31 But this would mean that our empirical
criteria for identifying and individuating atoms are radically at odds with
their true nature. Such a proposition at the very least threatens either the
physicality of the simple or our claim to knowledge of it.
Another way of arriving at phenomenalism focuses on our criteria for
the identification of physical space. It is similar to the Argument from
Concreteness and focuses on the essential mind-dependence of physical
spatial qualities and hence of physical space itself. Space is defined by rela-
tions of distance and direction. The only way to give empirical significance
to these bare, mathematical relations, however ultimately and indirectly, is
in egocentric terms. If distance is to be the relation that characterizes the
physical space our bodies move in, it must be unitized in human-relative
terms, terms that must correspond to a quality of distance as it manifests
itself, uniquely, within sensory consciousness. Similarly, for direction, ori-
entation, and chirality. Unless a space is mapped into the coordinates of
our perceptually accessible public space, and so into our various intersub-
jectively harmonized egocentric phenomenal spaces, we cannot interpret
it as having empirical significance. An abstract geometric space has differ-
ent properties from physical space, not the least of which are modal; and
so physical space cannot be identified with any geometric space. But if
space is thus mind-dependent, so too must be physical objects. For if they
are to be anything concrete, physical objects must be space-occupiers and
individuated by the regions of space they occupy over time.
In all cases, the arguments against realism focus on the incongruence
between the qualitative richness, the ascribed teleology, and the ontologi-
cal vagueness and indeterminacy of the manifest image, on the one hand,
and the bare mathematical structure of the scientific image on the other.
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Realism undermines our claims to scientific knowledge of the physical
world insofar as it would identify it with the reification of the scientific
image. The physical world as actually experienced consists of facts and en-
tities, which (i) have identities that are vague, indeterminate, and which
can be regarded from perspectives and interests that cannot be made log-
ically consistent with each other (as they would have to be, realistically
construed), and (ii) are conceptually dependent on mind-dependent sen-
sible qualities.
Idealist Conservation and Government
Even if physical realism is rejected, how is the idealist theologian to make
good on the phenomenalist proposal and account for the course of nature
as something under divine control? The phenomenalist claims that phys-
ical facts supervene on facts about minds. So obviously a phenomenalist
metaphysics for divine action requires a view of minds as ontologically
basic subjects. But if the arguments above are accepted, then the practice
of the sciences requires this commitment in any case, to account for the
generative source of perspectives and interpretations. Once accepted, this
metaphysics affords a strategy for constructing a variety of views of general
and special divine action in nature, including crucially the general action
of establishing human embodiment.
The phenomenalist wishes to account for items in the physical world as
the logical product of a series of constructive syntheses that occur within
the ordinary course of conscious experience. Most of these are innate, re-
flexive, and not introspectable. A full elaboration is beyond my present
scope, so I will keep to a few programmatic remarks.32
The phenomenalist’s account of the logical construction of the physical
world is not intended to be a genetic or developmental account within
empirical psychology; the idea rather is to provide a coherent description
from a transcendent perspective of how physical items can feature within
our empirical perspective as the things we take them to be in our ordi-
nary and scientific physical theories. So long as the phenomenalist can
do this by appealing only to conceptual resources that are drawn exclu-
sively from the mental realm, she will have satisfied the demand of co-
herence. The key insight that the phenomenalist will exploit is that there
is a rich set of organizational regularities, a stability of qualitative pat-
tern within and between our sensory episodes. These sensory regularities,
together with a stock of innate recognitional capacities that they prompt,
are sufficient for grounding the themes and regularities that feature in our
common physical theory—that our bodies are mobile occupants in a uni-
fied public space of other 3-D persistent objects—and subsequently in
the more refined descriptions and higher order interpretations of scientific
theories.
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The Logical Construction of the Physical from the Mental
Sensing and recognizing → {common sense theories → scientific theories}
(mental) [logically produces] (physical)
Per idealism, Gods creates and conserves the physical world by logically
constructing it from the following prephysical entities and facts:
(1) an ontology of immaterial mental subjects endowed with capacities
for receiving sensations and conceptually interpreting them;
(2) an ontology of repeatable sensory types that capture the qualitative
character of sensation in all its rich Gestalt organization (qualia);
(3) a divinely instituted system of laws that constrains the causal and
temporal distribution of qualia over minds in a way that guarantees
global intersubjective harmony; that is, that the qualitative patterns
are “world-suggestive.”
The laws mentioned in (3) would be nonphysical in that they would
only refer to immaterial subjects, their volitions, and the mental cau-
sation of their sensations. But because they would precondition the
regularities found within sensory experience and the conceptualization
of these regularities as physical, the laws in (3) are appropriately re-
garded as prephysical.33 According to idealism, what God must do to
produce the physical world is create human minds with certain in-
nate concepts for interpreting sensations and decree a system of laws
that causally constrains the course of possible human sensations in rela-
tion to human volition. In this way the physical world would be logi-
cally constructed from the regularities of sensory experience, something
whose qualitative content is drawn wholly from the manifest image that
is immanent within experience. As with familiar objects of the mani-
fest image, an idealist is free to say that objects studied by science do
exist, but in the conceptualist sense. This, it seems to me, is all that need
be and all that should be accepted when accepting the success of science.
On the phenomenalist view, God’s general direct action in provi-
dentially governing the physical world consists in sustaining the causal
organization of human sensory experience. So long as God does this
through a system of a laws guaranteeing the course of possible human sen-
sations, this action is sufficient to guarantee that objects in nature have the
dispositions they are ordinarily taken to have and that there are various
kinds of physical Fs in nature. The laws would be the truthmakers for
counterfactual statements, generalizations, and causal inferences that we
might make about physical Fs. Notice that such laws would not be phys-
ical laws of nature as typically conceived. In fact they would be prephysical
laws, or laws purely mental in character that sustain the world-suggestive
patterns of sensation. Generally, then, God would act in, for, and through
nature by the way God causally constrains human experience. The idealist
clearly distinguishes between the laws discovered within the physical world
Edward Epsen 937
and the prephysical laws that sustain it. There is a clear sense, then, in
which physical laws would hold with a force of necessity (as any law must);
but it would be a necessity that is itself contingent not only on divine
intention but on the human receptive capacity, sensory, and cognitive.
This allows the idealist to explain at once why it is not only that we can
imagine the miraculous suspension of physical laws but that we actually
have experienced miracles historically and may rationally hope to do so in
the future. Other proposals that regard the divine government of nature
as total and mediated through laws have already sought to regard physical
laws as flexible, open-ended, or encompassed within the greater divine
economy.34 By rejecting physical realism, the idealist can do more than
pay lip service to this theological commitment; she can show why any ap-
parent incompatibility between divine governing laws and physical laws is
dissolved.35
Theologians need a theistic account of the laws of nature that allows
for a genuine distinction between God’s general and special divine action.
The idealist’s prephysical nomological system can do this exactly because
it is prephysical. It need not take the necessity implied by physical laws as
ultimate, but can regard it as a genuine contingent necessity that can be
suspended, overridden, or simply subsumed into a more ultimate prephys-
ical law.
Embodiment and the Subjects of the Sciences
Where, then, does this leave the status of certain physical objects, like the
brain and the rest of the body, which seem to have an especially intimate
connection with our creaturely lives? Phenomenalism about the body and
the brain becomes a special case of phenomenalism about physical things
generally. Phenomenalism is conceptualist about the nature of kinds and
the individuation of things, maintaining that physical things are individ-
uated by sortal concepts which human beings deploy in response to ob-
servable qualities. There will be different options depending on the exact
theory of concept possession and individuation, but all will agree that con-
cepts involve a recognitional capacity. At the most basic level these will be
deployed in response to phenomenal qualities, but also to complexes of
other physical concepts. These concepts will be embedded in increasingly
refined scientific theories, but they will remain structurally dependent on
the qualitative content of sense perception, its basic organizational fea-
tures, and our capacity to be affected by these features in ways that make
a difference to our imaginative projections and judgments. The modali-
ties of human perception and our endowed rational sensitivities are thus
the fixed point around which the conceptual apparatus of science orbits.
The concepts used in brain science, for example, will be structurally re-
lated if not outright equipollent with concepts used in physics, chemistry,
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molecular biology, and various branches of physiology. Yet, they may also
possess a certain indispensability or even resistance to theoretical unifica-
tion. Of course the situation is dynamic and changes over time.
The general picture of the explanatory relations obtaining between
the transcendent perspective of metaphysics, in which the thesis of
phenomenalism is articulated, and the empirical perspective in which
natural scientific theories are articulated can be captured by a principle
that Bishop Berkeley employed crucially in the defense of his own version
of phenomenalism. The principle is what I, modifying a name coined
by Bertil Belfrage, call the Principle of Analogous Fields of Discourse.
The idea is that strictly within and relative to the human empirical
viewpoint (which, transcendentally, we say is created by some prephysical
nomological organization of our sensations), scientific theories enjoy
a certain conceptual autonomy. This would apply to neuroscience in
particular. The idea is that a science practitioner, say a neuroscientist,
is free to employ descriptions that presuppose or take for granted the
various phenomenological syntheses that logically build up the physical
world at our viewpoint. The working scientist can make idealizations,
use metaphors and mathematical models, propose new theoretical terms
and mechanisms, and invoke causal relations. But because this discursive
framework has all the while suppressed its phenomenological precondi-
tions, however justifiably, its apparatus then cannot be exported directly to
the discursive framework of metaphysics. The principle, then, is a slightly
more sophisticated version of Berkeley’s maxim to think with the learned,
speak with the vulgar, adding the scientific as one more way to speak.
The Principle of Analogous Fields of Discourse (PAFD)
The thing is explained physically, not by assigning the really acting and
immaterial cause, but by demonstrating its connexion with a mechanical
principle…
A body in motion is dashed against another at rest; but we use an active
mode of expression, saying, that the one impels the other, and not improperly
in mechanics, where the mathematical rather than the actual causes of things
are considered.
For Berkeley, there are three internally nested discursive frameworks that
we might adopt, metaphysics as the outermost, ordinary folk discourse at
the center, and scientific discourse in the middle. They are thought of as
analogous in their relations because of the way they semantically delimit
each other, particularly in respect of the notion of cause.
Three Kinds of Cause
A. Common sense physical causes (the mallet, A, broke the almond, B.)
B. Mechanical principles (F A = −F B)
C. Real causes (I exercised my volition; transcendent sources caused certain
sensations).
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According to the PAFD, one finds that the pair of explanatory terms cause
/effect are related across the internal nesting structure of the discursive fields
in such a way that the cause of the lower or more restricted field becomes
the effect of the one above it. Descriptively, the regularity of succession in
experience prompts us to say that when one object collides into another
the first causes the motion of the second (“the mallet broke the almond”).
But in the theoretical science of mechanics we say that both motions are
effects of a relevant mechanical principle (Newton’s third law of motion—
opposing forces are equal). Finally in metaphysics we recognize that even
fundamental mechanical principles are but a descriptive regularity whose
applicability to experience calls for explanation, and must be the effect of
some transcendent or prephysical agency (from the phenomenalist’s per-
spective, the applicability will be a higher order organizational effect of a
prephysical constraint on human sensation within the context of our con-
ceptual capacities).
The PAFD makes sense of our ordinary practice of interpreting a psy-
chological subject’s relation to an organismic body as one of two-way
causal dependence. The conditions of the body affect our sensations, and
our desires and intentions affect our body. According to the principle, this
can be true if interpreted as a statement made within the empirical dis-
cursive frameworks; at the same time, it is a truth that is preconditioned
by the truth of a thesis of metaphysics, framed within the transcendent
perspective. If phenomenalism is true, then the principle allows neurosci-
entific theory to invoke causal relations in the conceptualist sense and so
in particular to talk of certain psychophysical relations as genuinely causal.
But the principle prohibits such statements from being interpreted realisti-
cally, and so ensuring their compatibility with the phenomenalist corollary
that the only ontologically primitive causes are non-physical.
The PAFD, unlike the Thomist’s realist construal of causal activity in
nature, can make sense of how natural phenomena can be causal in a gen-
uinely derivative sense that does not compete with the causal power of
rational agents. Taken in the realist sense, natural phenomena either
causally exclude each other and human mental activity or lack causal
agency altogether. This is because realism requires that some entities
and facts of the physical world are ontologically primitive and mind-
independent. This means in turn that if the category of the physical is
to have its integrity and closure, all other (ontologically derivative) physi-
cal phenomena must supervene on the primitive physical base. There may
be sciences that selectively attribute autonomous explanatory features to
different domains, but realism about these features requires one to make
a choice between regarding them as strongly reducible (in the nomic or
analytic sense) or strongly emergent.37 Following from Robinson’s argu-
ment for dualism, any realist middle position to the effect that these fea-
tures are weakly emergent cannot explain why they should supervene on
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the base and yet fail to be nomically reducible to it. Even worse, realism
about the explanatorily significant features studied in the sciences requires
that the classical logic of identity strictly applies to them. But given the
indiscernibility of identicals and the vagueness and the plurality of empiri-
cally discernible features which physical objects can be regarded as having,
it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that in each different dis-
cursive framework there either are no objects or the empirical criteria we
use to identify them are false.38 Either way, our claim to possessing scien-
tific knowledge would be undermined. A plausible alternative is to deny
physical realism and to regard the human perspective, with its concepts
and interests, as playing an ontologically mediating role in the construc-
tion of identities, and in fact partly through the feature attributions made
in the sciences. Without regarding such attributions as so many different
ways of conceptualizing an underlying base, it is difficult to make sense
of their mutual inconsistency and incompleteness. Taken in the concep-
tualist sense, however, there are no such formal requirements, only the
more modest requirements that science actually imposes: harmonization
and empirical adequacy.
Returning to the issue of the phenomenalist interpretation of the brain
sciences, we have another concrete example of the way the PAFD relates
theology and metaphysics to the natural sciences. In the transcendent per-
spective we can say that minds are ontologically primitive and brains (and
bodies generally) are conceptually constructed. But what is more, we can
say that the psychophysical correlations discovered in the empirical per-
spective of neuropsychology can be interpreted as specifications of the
functional links that are appropriate for the kind of psychophysical ar-
rangement that counts as human embodiment (rather than what counts as
human mentality). While such appropriateness will be guided by norms of
epistemic and rational efficiency, and so supplied externally, neuropsychol-
ogy can help us to target and describe candidates that meet these norms.
The psychophysical correlations discovered in neuroscientific fields help
us to understand the nature of the two-way functional dependence be-
tween the mental subject and the organism that belongs to it as the sub-
ject’s body. This gives the idealist a positive research program in which
the various sciences of the human brain and organism, together with an
autonomous psychology, are recruited not to explain the nature or ori-
gins of mentality but to understand the functional nature of embodiment.
Once we accept an immaterialist anthropology and reject physical realism
so that it no longer guides our view of how scientific theorizing should be
interpreted generally, then we become free to evaluate the contributions of
neuroscience in fruitful ways.39
The PAFD makes clear the sense in which a theology of nature may
expect to achieve consonance with science but not traction if traction re-
quires a leveling and collation of the discursive frameworks. On an idealist
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view natural phenomena are effects of the causal interaction among spir-
its, regarded from the transcendent or world-external perspective proper
to theology and metaphysics. From the mundane or world-internal per-
spective of how things are at the human observational viewpoint, the same
natural phenomena may be regarded as causes. There is a semantic delim-
iting of the empirical perspective by the transcendent that enables descrip-
tions of the causal structure among natural phenomena in the derivative or
conceptualist sense. This same semantic delimiting is what prevents those
descriptions from being reified into trans-empirical causes in the primary
sense. This means that, contra the physicalist, to act in nature God does
not need to act “bottom up,” as it is sometimes put, by acting on what,
within the world-internal empirical perspective is regarded as the subven-
ing base of physics. But, contra hylomorphism and emergentism, neither
does God need to act on the various supervening properties of the special
sciences. Theologically, divine providential action is total and should not
be regarded as divided in ways that would reflect the structural relations
among the various sciences. God would not need first to act on the ob-
jects of physics nor separately on the various weakly emergent domains of
study that have their own proper explanatory resources. On the idealist
view, God’s action in the physical world is total and undivided partly be-
cause it is ontologically mediated by a prephysical system of nomological
constraints on human minds. With this system of control in place, then,
together with the endowment of human creatures with a stock of innate
conceptual capacities, there is nothing more God need do to ensure that
a certain kind of world is logically constructed at the human empirical
viewpoint. The sciences find their place in this scheme as rational prac-
tices that aim to characterize just what kind of world it is that is thus
transcendently produced and governed, thematizing how things are from
our observational viewpoint. The transcendent factors that enable science’s
epistemic success also keep it modestly limited to what is conditional upon
and relative to the prephysical being of that very viewpoint.
Conclusion
Theologians have gotten themselves into a conundrum over divine action.
Recognizing the deism of the first-wave causal joint proposals they have
insisted on divine immanence and compatibilist double agency in nature.
But, still presuming the truth of physical realism, they have struggled to
explicate how it could be that God is both the ground of nature’s activity
and a transcendent special actor.
I agree with physicalists like Jaegwon Kim (1999), Sarah Lane Ritchie
(2019), and others that nonreductive physicalism is an untenable middle
ground between a strict physicalism and dualism. But my grounds for
doing so—and so for choosing dualism over physicalism—have to do
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with what I see as the reasons why various sciences are not nomologically
reducible to physics. Nonbasic natural phenomena require conceptual
interpretation and transposable gestalten. Rather than being constituted
by fixed, ontologically primitive forms that inhere in mind-external
substances, identities for things in ordinary discourse, and all nonbasic
scientific discourse, are relative to interests, perceptual perspective, and
teleological ascriptions. To account for such a plurality of nonbasic sci-
ences we must accept that there are basic mental subjects with concepts,
interests, and perspectives. Without accepting these, we would have no
account of what generates the flexible identities of natural and social phe-
nomena. But if human conceptualizers are what generate the subjects of
the nonbasic sciences, then even basic scientific knowledge is conceptually
dependent on the qualities that feature in sensory consciousness. This is
because our concepts of the physical are ways of interpreting our sensory
experience. Without being anchored in mind-dependent experience,
they would lack qualitative content and so would fail to be concepts of
the physical as opposed to the merely formal or mathematical. Physical
concepts that are more than merely formal are logical constructions of
qualities and relations found within and between conscious experiences.
On the idealist view, it is the wholly objective but prephysical causal
structure of experience, together with our native concepts and interests,
that logically produces the phenomena of nature, as we actually experience
and categorize them. Natural phenomena are thus created and governed
through a literal divine discourse addressed to the human mind, in which
sensations become signs. The phenomena of nature may be nomologically
established before man is created. They are created, that is, once God has
provided the ordinances for their potential execution. But they gain their
signification, as phenomena for us, when Adam names them.
The idealist proposal for divine action, by its construction, re-imagines
the relation between science and theology. The outcome enriches Barbour
(1989)’s fourfold typology by adding to it something very similar to the
premodern model of subalternation.40 On this model, knowledge of na-
ture gained through the sciences does not replace, eliminate, or reduce
our prescientific knowledge of nature, the human person, and divinity.
Rather scientific knowledge of nature is conditioned by that prescientific
knowledge so that nature may be understood to function symbolically
within a logically prior divine economy centered on the divine-human
relationship.41 As the realm of the observable, nature could be understood
as a divine system of signs, and divine action in nature could be understood
to be directly communicative. This would allow nature to be fully objec-
tive in the sense of being public, persistent, intersubjectively harmonious,
and regulatively grounded in something over and above human volition,
but without being metaphysically basic or logically mind-independent, as
it would be under the views of realism and naturalism.
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Notes
1. See Wildman 2004 for a report on the details of the project.
2. See, for example, Saunders 2002 and Smedes 2008.
3. See, for example, McGrath 2004, Peacocke 1979, and Torrance 1969.
4. See, for example, Clayton 2000, Cooper 2006, and Clayton and Davies 2006. See also
Knight 2004, 48–61.
5. I think this is true of the science and theology scholars named above.
6. For example, in McGrath 2004, Polkinghorne 1994, and Peacocke 1979.
7. Torrance 1969, xiii.
8. So physical realism is a version of what Kant called transcendental realism, to which his
own transcendental idealism was explicitly formulated as a rejection in the first Critique (A369,
A491/B518-19). Kantian idealism therefore counts as a version of what I call idealism below.
9. For this reason it is a mistake to argue for realism on the grounds that, to use Alis-
ter McGrath’s phrase, “realism is the working philosophy of the natural sciences” (McGrath
2004, 125–129). The question of realism is not to be decided by the statistical study of the
private opinion of working scientists. Scientists are not typically trained at a postgraduate level
in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphysics, which is where one would locate the
question of realism. Furthermore, when it comes to assessing the cognitive aims of science—say,
ultimate truth versus empirical adequacy—we must distinguish the cognitive aims of a local
research program from the personal aims of its practitioners. The latter may include a variety
of non-cognitive but pragmatic aims, such as obtaining notoriety and future funding, as well as
instrumental cognitive aims, all of which should be distinguished from the non-personal aims
of the project or practice itself, which are determined by norms, principles, protocols, method-
ologies, definitions, and so forth. For all we know it may be that scientists who are personally
committed to realism turn out to be better able to contribute to their project’s more modest goal
of empirical adequacy within some domain of phenomena, perhaps because they become more
motivated and creative; yet this would give no evidentiary support to realism. For an explanation
and defense of empirical adequacy as the aim of scientific practice see van Fraassen (1980).
10. Sellars 1963.
11. Notice that this does not exactly correspond to the distinction between the macro-level
world and the micro-level world.
12. See, for example, Jaworski (2011), Dodds (2012), and Clayton (2006), though Clay-
ton’s various formulations of emergence seem to vacillate between its weak and strong forms.
That is, it is unclear whether, in the terms below, he is committed to the merely natural su-
pervenience (and hence strong emergence) of the mental from the physical, or in fact to logical
supervenience.
13. As on the weak emergentist/nonreductive physicalist account of Nancey Murphy
(2008; 2010).
14. Examples of successful nomic reduction are the unification of the theories of electricity
and magnetism via the Lorentz force law and Maxwell’s equations, and the integration of chem-
istry and quantum physics in Linus Pauling’s quantum mechanical description of the chemical
bond.
15. Such explanatory or nomological pluralism has become a prominent theme in cur-
rent philosophy of science following Cartwright (1999) and the push to relocalize the study of
science. See, for example, Huggett (2000) and Asay (2019).
16. In the analytic behaviorism of Gilbert Ryle (1963), psychological predicates were to
be defined in terms of behavior, and in the analytic physicalism of the logical empiricists Carl
Hempel (1980) and Rudolf Carnap (1934), psychological predicates were to be translated into
“quantitatively determinate” properties of positions in space and time.
17. For example, Clayton (2004; 2006) and Dodds (2012), respectively.
18. Note that the mind-independence at issue here is independence of human minds or
facts about them, rather than independence of a divine mind; physical realism need not exclude
theism.
19. In what follows I often use ‘idealism’ and ‘phenomenalism’ casually as synonyms. Tech-
nically, by ‘idealism’ I mean merely the denial of both conjuncts of the thesis of physical realism
and by ‘phenomenalism’ I mean the further positive thesis stated here. So phenomenalism is one
version of idealism but not entailed by it.
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For further clarification by contrast, one could identify the thesis of mental realism as a cur-
rently and historically significant third position: the physical world is (at least partially) mind-
dependent and ontologically primitive (this follows the definitional scheme in Foster 1982,
3–16). Mental realism thus forms a kind of halfway house between physical realism and ide-
alism, insisting that there is some core of the physical world that is not reducible to anything
else but whose underlying nature turns out to be mental in character, whether intellectual, affec-
tive/volitional, or sensory qualitative. Contemporary panpsychism (e.g., Strawson 2006) would
count as a version of mental realism.
20. Robinson (2016, 178).
21. Notice how this claim differs from a social constructivism. The phenomenalist argues
not so much that physical predicates are the product of social negotiation, but that a necessary
contribution is made to physical identities by our innate concepts and sensory modalities.
22. The psychologist Christian Ehrenfels introduced the term gestaltqualitäten for the com-
plex, relational qualities in perceptual experience that have no constant correlation with any
physical marker or even any other phenomenal marker. A single shape, for example, can be
formed by the boundaries of any colored surface, with any texture, containing anything or
nothing at all, and be located anywhere; just as a melody can be composed of an endless ar-
ray of tones and remains invariant under a change of key. Such qualities, which are ubiquitous
in human perception, are thus “transposable.” The fact that there is no finite equivalence class
of physicals values that correlate with our experience of transposable gestalten means that they
must be studied as sui generis but also manifestly mind-dependent phenomenal qualities. Köhler
(1947, especially p. 118), is a classic source for further reading.
23. In other words, none of the items are the sort of thing that could be studied by physics,
which could only describe them as collections of atoms arranged in certain ways, yet there is a
clear sense in which they supervene on their material constituents.
24. This is the basis of faery stories, like Sylvester and the Magic Pebble, where a donkey can
be turned into a rock and back to a donkey and remain a ‘person’ all along. Children instantly
grasp these psychic identity conditions with no explanation needed.
25. Robinson (2016, Ch.13) contains a discussion of this, largely by way of a reductio
argument against Daniel Dennett’s concession that the “intentional stance” is ineliminable but
also (somehow) compatible with a behavioristic naturalism about the mind.
26. Though desirable, considerations of space preclude a fuller treatment of the idealist’s
case for the self as a basic mental subject. The reader is referred to the argument in Madell
(1981), which is complementary to the one offered here, and the discussion in Robinson (2016,
Ch. 15).
27. This is an old thesis that will be familiar to readers of the Leibniz-Clarke correspon-
dence. See Alexander (1956).
28. The idealist thus agrees with the panpsychist that the only real individuals are psychic
individuals. But the idealist is more epistemically modest, claiming that the only beings we know
to be in included in this category are human mental subjects.
29. Obviously the elementary particles of the Standard Model are more plausible candi-
dates for being physical simples. But speaking of atoms is more expedient and this in no way
effects the argument.
30. We may have “localist” intuitions that something that came into existence 1 millimeter
to the right would be the same atom and 1 light-year away would be a different atom; but that
means there will be vague cases somewhere in between. Robinson’s point is that realism is intol-
erant of such vagueness. See Chapter 12, especially pp. 205-9. His claim relies on the treatment
of the logical of identity in Wiggins (2001), where it is argued that the classical logic of strict
identity (with Leibniz’s Law) must apply to any formal system whose entities are represented as
ontologically primitive.
31. For a discussion of this option see the “Introduction” to Castellani (1998) and Paul
Teller’s contribution to that volume.
32. See Chapters VII and VIII of Epsen (2020). The body is distinguished in these synthe-
ses by its centrality in the construction of egocentric phenomenal space, as a qualitatively stable
theme that has an immediate connection with the subject’s will in a way other themes do not.
33. These are what Bishop Berkeley called the “Laws of Nature” (PHK 30).
34. See, for example, Yong (2009), Smith (2010), and Knight (2004).
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35. Following the legal simile, divine laws may be such as to include the provisions for the
sustention of certain patterns of human sensation—and hence what we then call physical laws—
but also to include a kind of codicil for God to suspend or alter those provisions in accordance
with God’s broader economic purpose, resulting in what we call miracles. By distinguishing
between transcendent and empirical laws, the idealist can explain why there are both genuine
physical laws and genuine miracles with no inconsistency and no threat to the simplicity of the
divine act that is at once creative and redemptive.
36. Berkeley, De Motu 69, 70, emphasis is mine.
37. Notice that this would lead to radical ontological proliferation from beyond dualism
or trialism to an n-ism for each of the n nonreducible sciences.
38. A full defense of the claim that there cannot be things in the realist sense with gen-
uinely vague identities would take us far afield. But see Evans (1978) for a concise (in fact one
page!) argument that depends only on the assumption of Leibniz’s Law (the Indiscernibility of
Identicals).
39. Perhaps surprisingly, we also become free to recycle what would otherwise be defunct
theories in the philosophy of mind. For example, functionalism fails as theory of what it is to
possess a mind; but it is a fruitful theory of what it is to possess a body. Guided by a function-
alist philosophy of embodiment, we can interpret neuroscientific facts as providing important
details about what it is to be embodied, about the ways in which our (prephysical) mental bi-
ographies can undergo changes in response to changes in the (conceptualized) environment.
Functionalism and the type-identity thesis fail because there is no way conceptually to capture
the psychological character of mental episodes through a specification of their functional links
in either computational or physiological terms. But once we accept minds and their episodes
into our basic ontology, functionalism provides the right strategy for understanding the factors
that contribute to the total psychophysical arrangement that constitutes embodiment. Beliefs,
sensorimotor volitions, and sensory perceptions all have to be matched with each other and with
their corresponding neural states in an appropriately matching way, as determined by the psy-
chological character of such episodes. Thus consider the difference between functionalism as a
philosophy of mind and ‘embodiment functionalism’ as a scheme for recruiting the work of the
brain and behavioral sciences:
Mind Functionalism
Pain = the state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something
is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the
absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning.
vs. Embodiment Functionalism
A subject S is ‘pain-embodied’ in an organism O iff: when S feels pain (a psychological condi-
tion), O tends to be undergoing injury and this injury affects those states of O’s central nervous
system (if any) that are correlated with S’s belief that something is wrong with the body…
Note that some of the conditions on the right-hand side of the matching in turn depend
on the specification of other functional links, referring in this case to beliefs and states of the
central nervous. So similarly, an embodiment-functionalist strategy could be applied to explicate
the functional link required for a mental subject to be “belief-embodied,” “behavior-embodied,”
and “F-embodied” for other more refined psychological predicates F.
Essential to the prospects of such a strategy is that it is content to allow psychological kinds
to be identified entirely by their subjective character and to allow the corresponding physiolog-
ical and environmental conditions to be identified by their purely empirical character (with a
computational theory perhaps mediating the epistemically efficient matching between them in a
theoretical context). This strategy is uniquely available to the phenomenalist, who is both a strict
realist about minds as ontologically basic subjects and conceptualist about physical phenomena,
regarding them as naturally supervenient on minds and facts about their prephysical powers and
causal organization.
40. See Livesey (1990) for more on how medieval philosophers understood subalternation.
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